In this paper we investigate the influence of two factors on the risk taking behaviour of hedge fund managers. The first factor is the past performance of the fund relative to the performance of each fund's peer. The second is the option-like features of the typical hedge fund manager's compensation structure. We aim to answer questions of the following kind: do those funds that find that their incentive option is out of the money increase risk or viceversa? We then attempt to reconcile these results with the theoretical frameworks proposed. We believe these questions to be of critical importance given the recent performance of the hedge fund industry. Based upon performance to end of October 2008, it is clear that many funds will find themselves considerably below their high water marks and with significantly less assets under management. Our work here may help to throw some light on the likely response of hedge fund managers to this current crisis.
Introduction
The ideal fee structure aligns the incentives of the investor with those of the fund manager.
Investors will normally be looking to maximise their risk-adjusted return while fund managers will seek to maximise their fees. Mutual funds typically only charge a management fee which is a proportion of the funds under management. This traditional fee structure can only align fund manager and investor objectives to a limited degree: if the investor is unsatisfied with the performance of the manager they can usually withdraw their funds thus reducing the fee to zero. Hedge funds on the other hand generally charge both a management fee and an incentive fee which is a fraction of the fund's return each year in excess of a high-water mark.
It is clear that this structure aligns the objectives of these two parties more closely since they both stand to benefit from incrementally better performance.
However hedge fund incentive fees are a contentious issue for two important reasons. First the fees can be very large as a proportion of the fund and can therefore be a drag on the performance of the fund 3 . Depending upon the variance of returns Goetzmann et al (2003) estimate that the performance fee effectively costs investors between 10 and 20 percent of the portfolio. Clearly investing in a hedge fund would only be rational if they provide a large, positive risk-adjusted return which compensates for these fees.
The second and perhaps more interesting issue is whether the incentive fees provide the manager with the right incentives anyway. On the one hand Anson (2001) , who describes incentive fees as a "free option", argues that the option-like nature of the incentive fee will lead the manager to increase the volatility of returns in order to maximise the value of this option. This is a view that is partially supported by Goetzmann et al (2003) who state that "the manager has the incentive to increase risk provided other non modelled considerations are not overriding". An opposing view is presented by L'Habitant (2007) who considers the incentive fee as an option premium paid to the hedge fund manager by the investor. This premium ensures that the manager will optimise the size of the fund to keep returns high because the incentives for superior performance can be greater than for asset growth. He argues that the absence of incentive fees (for example in mutual funds) leads the manager to maximise funds under management, which is not necessarily in the interests of the investor who is seeking to maximise risk-adjusted returns.
Several recent papers have examined the effect that incentive fees have upon the optimal dynamic investment strategies of fund managers within a theoretical framework. Typically these papers present a framework with one risky and one riskless asset and then examine the allocation the manager would make to each asset under various scenarios. The theoretical results provide a range of possible behaviour depending upon: the assumptions made about manager preferences'; the possibility of fund liquidation; and the assumed level of the management's stake in the fund. Thus the models illustrate the importance of what Goetzmann et al (2003) describe as "non-modelled considerations", or what could also be described as implicit rather than explicit contract terms.
The explicit terms of the compensation contract are that investors agree to pay the manager a fixed percentage of positive returns while accepting all of the downside, if the contract was this simple then the manager would, as Anson (2001) describes, simply possess a call option on the future performance of the fund which would provide the manager with an incentive to increase risk. However, there are also many implicit terms to the contract that are more difficult to model, some of which will mitigate this problem and others that may exacerbate it.
For example, investors will expect the hedge fund manger to invest a substantial percentage of their own net worth in the fund and penalise them for poor performance (or for excessive risk taking) by withdrawing their funds (just as a mutual fund client would). This will mitigate some of this risk taking. However, risk taking might be exacerbated if as has been illustrated using mutual fund flow data, fund flows are a convex function of past performance where good performance leads to significant fund inflows, but where poor performance leads to smaller net outflows. This results in manager compensation having a call option-like feature that can induce the manager to indulge in excessive risk-taking.
In this paper we present empirical evidence of the influence of the hedge fund industry's typical fee structure on the risk taking behaviour of hedge fund managers. Our analysis takes explicit account of the option-like features of the compensation structure. We also analyse the various hedge fund strategies separately rather than assuming that manager behaviour is effectively unaffected by their strategies, which is often the implicit assumption of other work in this area. Amongst other things, our results enable us to distinguish between and to say something about the competing theoretical models that seek to identify the relationship between incentives and hedge fund manager behaviour. To do this we use a large database of hedge fund returns and identify each fund's position relative to its peer group and to its high-water mark. After identifying the position of each fund in each of these two ways we can then examine whether hedge fund managers adjust the volatility of their fund in response to their performance relative to other hedge funds or the "moneyness" of the performance option.
We aim to answer questions of the following kind: do those funds that find that their incentive option is out of the money "put it all on black" and increase risk; do they maintain risk levels; or do they reduce them? We then attempt to reconcile these results with the theoretical frameworks proposed.
We believe these questions to be of critical importance given the recent performance of the hedge fund industry. Based upon performance to end of October 2008 it is clear that many funds will find themselves considerably below their high water marks and with significantly less assets under management as we move in to 2009. According to the CSFB Tremont hedge fund indices, the year-to-end of October performance of the average hedge fund has been -15.5%. And of the twelve strategies for which they compile performance only twoDedicated Short Bias and Managed Futures -have produced a positive average return over this period. Our work here, may help to throw some light on the likely response of hedge fund managers to this current crisis.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature related to our analysis, Section 3 outlines the data and construction methodology, Section 4 presents the results, Section 5 compares the results with the literature and Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
The conflicting results of theoretical models of fund manager behaviour in the presence of incentive fees and the importance of the implicit terms is clearly illustrated by contrasting the findings of Carpenter (2000), Goetzmann et al (2003) and Panageas and Westerfield (2008) .
Carpenter (2000) examined the optimal risk taking behaviour of a risk-averse mutual fund manager who is paid with a call option on the assets they control (similar to hedge fund incentive fees). She found that a manager paid with an incentive fee increases the risk of the fund's investment strategy if the fund's return is below the hurdle rate and decreases the risk if the fund is above the hurdle rate. Carpenter's analysis is for a single evaluation period and does not consider the possibility of the fund being liquidated unless the value goes to zero. Goetzmann et al (2003) provide a closed-form solution to the cost of hedge fund fee contracts subject to a number of assumptions in a continuous time framework. They model incentive fees as an option and find that the cost of the contract rises as the portfolio's variance rises and hence conclude that the manager has the incentive to increase risk "provided other non modelled considerations are not overriding". The authors include the possibility that the fund can be liquidated if its value falls below a specified boundary and show that as the fund's value approaches this boundary the manager will reduce risk. So whereas Carpenter's theoretical manager would increase (decrease) risk as the fund value falls (rises) Goetzmann et al's would decrease (increase) risk as it falls (rises). Panageas and Westerfield (2008) find that a manager compensated with an incentive fee and a highwater mark will place a constant fraction in the risky asset if they are operating in an infinite horizon setting. The intuition behind this is that the manager does not optimise just one option but an infinite time series of options, a manager who is below the high-water mark could increase the value of the current option by taking excessive risk today. However this will decrease the value of future options because it will also increase the probability of negative returns while the high-watermark is still fixed.
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) consider the optimal risk-taking behaviour of an expectedutility maximising manager of a hedge fund who is compensated by both a management fee and an incentive fee. The authors also examine the effect of several implicit terms including the manager's own investment in the fund, a liquidation barrier where the fund is shut down due to poor performance and the ability of the manager to voluntarily shut down the fund as well as to enhance the fund's Sharpe Ratio through additional effort. Using a numerical approach they find that seemingly slight adjustments to the compensation structure can have dramatic effects on managerial risk taking behaviour. Specifically, they find that the existence of a liquidation barrier and an assumption that the managers own a percentage of the fund inhibits excessive risk taking as the fund value falls.
In Figure 1 we present a stylised summary of the differences between Carpenter's (2000) Goetzmann et al 's (2003) , Panageas and Westerfield's (2008) and Hodder and Jackwerth's However, even in the absence of incentive fees there are implicit terms to the compensation contract that could encourage excessive risk taking. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) showed that if fund flows are a convex function of past performance, that is to say that more money flows into strong performers than out of weak performers, because the management fees are a fixed percentage of assets under management they will display call option like features. This in turn creates incentives for fund managers to increase or decrease the risk of the fund that are dependent on the fund's year-to-date return. Sirri and Tufano (1998) and others have confirmed that flows in and out of mutual funds do exhibit this convexity, superior relative performance leads to the growth of assets under management while there is no substantial outflow in response to poor relative performance. This flow/performance relationship was investigated for hedge funds by Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) who find that funds in the top quintile of performers exhibit an inflow of 63%, while the bottom quintile exhibits an outflow of only 3%.
An empirical investigation of the risk taking behaviour of mutual funds for the 16 year period from 1976 to 1991 was undertaken by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) . Using a contingency table approach they showed that mutual fund managers undertake what they termed as "tournament behaviour", with funds whose mid-year returns were below the median (losers) increasing volatility in the latter part of the year by more than those funds whose mid-year returns were above the median (winners). The authors concluded that this behaviour was a direct consequence of the adverse incentives described above. Managers who have performed poorly by mid-year have incentives to increase their risk level to try and improve their ranking by the year-end; whereas managers with strong mid-year performance appeared to reduce risk in order to maintain their ranking.
The empirical relationship between risk taking and incentives in hedge funds has been examined by Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) and Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) and many others. Using a regression approach Ackerman et al (1999) found a positive and significant relationship between the Sharpe ratio and the level of incentive fees but no statistically significant relationship between the level of risk (as measured by the standard deviation of returns) and the level of incentive fees. The authors concluded that this was evidence that the incentive structure was effective because it attracted top managers while not increasing their propensity to take on risk. Using a sample of hedge funds and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) from the TASS database Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) showed that survival probability depends on absolute and relative performance, excess volatility, and on fund age. Perhaps not surprisingly the authors found that excess risk and poor relative performance substantially increased the probability of termination which they argue is a cost sufficient to offset the adverse incentive of excessive risk taking provided by the fee contract. Using a contingency table approach similar to Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) they found that funds tend to increase (decrease) their risk in response to poor (strong) relative performance but not in response to their absolute performance.
Data and Methodology

Data
A major limitation of earlier studies is that they implicitly assume that hedge funds are a homogenous asset class. In practice however, the term "hedge fund" refers to the structure of the investment vehicle rather than the investment strategy being followed. Different strategies have varying levels of risk and historic return which makes a strategy level comparison essential if the results are to be meaningful. The data that we use in this study have been extracted from the TASS live and graveyard databases from January 1994 through to December 2007. More specifically, we extract monthly Net Asset Values (NAV), strategy details and inception dates for all hedge funds that are denominated in US Dollars, that report monthly and that have reported for at least one full calendar year over this sample period. These criteria result in a total sample of 4,990 funds of which 2,449 are currently reporting and 2,541 are no longer reporting. The data are summarised in Table 1 . The total number of funds has increased rapidly over time from just over 500 in 1994 to approximately 2,500 in 2007, of which the long/short equity category comprised 950. The mean and median fund sizes have also increased over time, the difference between these two statistics indicate that the sample is dominated by smaller funds. There is a similar but less pronounced pattern in the fund age.
Table 1 here
Using the net asset values (NAVs) of each fund as reported in the TASS database we calculate the monthly gross returns of each hedge fund over time using the a slightly modified 4 version of the procedure outlined in Brooks et al (2007) which is described in detail in the Appendix. We use gross rather than net returns in order to isolate changes in risk that are a result of manager behaviour rather than being due to the mechanics of the incentive contract since incentive fees can have the effect of lowering the standard deviation of observed net returns when a fund is above its high-water mark which could clearly bias the results (see Brooks et al (2007) 
Methodology
One has to be extremely careful when interpreting the relationship between the risk choices of a fund manager in response to returns because the two are inherently linked. Figure 2 (taken from Brooks et al (2007) ) shows the distribution of hedge fund returns conditional upon the moneyness of the incentive option for three sub-samples defined as "at the money" (ATM), "in the money" (ITM) and "out of the money" (OTM) using the data described in section 3.1 of this paper. The standard deviation of both the OTM and the ITM samples are statistically larger than for the ATM sample, which could support the hypothesis that hedge funds increase their risk when they are significantly below or above their high-water mark as defined in expression (1).
Figure 2 here
However there is an alternative explanation for the above result: funds that produce high return volatility are more likely to have extremely positive (or negative) performance and hence more likely to be classified as in (or out) of the money. Whereas funds with low return volatility are less likely to have had extreme return outcomes and hence are more likely to be classified as at the money. In order to investigate this we calculate the annualised standard deviation of gross returns for the funds in our sample for each calendar year as well as the moneyness of the incentive option at the end of the year. We then split the sample into 12 sub-samples based on levels of moneyness between 0.70 and 1.30 and calculate the median standard deviation for each sub sample. The results are presented in Figure 3 .
Figure 3 here
The "V" shape of figure 3 illustrates that the alternative explanation of our earlier results is extremely possible. Those funds with historically lower standard deviation are more likely to be closer to "at the money" whereas those with higher standard deviation are more likely to be significantly in or out of the money.
In order to examine whether funds adjust the risk of their portfolios in response to their performance we need to examine the standard deviation of returns before and after a specific assessment point in time.
Using gross monthly hedge fund returns we calculate the annualised performance of fund f between January and month M. Specifically, for each fund f in a given year y, we calculate the M-month cumulative return as follows:
where r f is the monthly gross return for hedge fund f. In our initial analysis we set M to 6 (June), but we also allow month M to vary between April and August so that the return is measured over periods ranging from four to eight months. We refer to this period as the "assessment period", that is, the period over which we assess the performance of each fund.
In order to analyse whether hedge funds adjust the risk of their portfolios in the post assessment period, that is from month M to December, we follow Brown et al (1996) and calculate the Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR) using the following expression:
( ) where RAR fy represents the RAR of fund f in year y. Expression (3) is simply the ratio of the standard deviation of returns for the post assessment period to the standard deviation of returns over the assessment period. In our base case the assessment period is from January to June (M=6). This analysis is conducted using non-overlapping assessment and post assessment periods.
As well as assessing the performance of the fund from January to month M, we also calculate the moneyness of the incentive fee option at the end of month M. The performance of any fund over the assessment period might be above the median return for its strategy, but still may not be sufficient to lift the fund's performance above its high water mark and therefore may not be enough for the manger to be able to claim a performance fee. By using moneyness as a way of categorising the position of the fund and therefore the fund manager's attitude to risk, we can assess the influence not only of relative performance, but also the value of the incentive option on manager behaviour.
We analyse the post-assessment performance of the fund f relative to the performance of the hedge fund strategy to which it belongs. We therefore ask whether the funds adjust their behaviour relative to their peer group. We normalise the post assessment return and the RAR by using the following expressions:
where s is one of the ten individual strategies being considered such that Normalised Return and Normalised RAR are measures of how fund f either performed or changed risk relative to other funds following the same strategy for a particular period. A value greater (less) than one for each expressions (5) and (6) should therefore be taken to indicate that the fund in question has either outperformed (underperformed) its peer group, or increased (decreased) its risk by more (less) than its peer group for the particular period in question.
Using the variables calculated above we construct 2x2 contingency tables in order to test whether hedge funds adjust their risk in response to either their relative performance or the moneyness of their incentive option. Specifically we construct two 2x2 tables where we split the funds into those with high (Normalised RAR>0) or low (Normalised RAR<0) Risk Adjustment Ratios conditioned upon either past performance or moneyness. The null hypothesis in each case is that the percentage of the sample population falling into each of the high or low RAR categories is independent of either the return or the moneyness. The statistical significance of these frequencies is tested in 2 ways: i) a chi-square test having one degree of freedom (though this might be misspecified as it assumes the cell counts are independent); and ii) the log odds ratio, which is robust to the misspecification of the chi-square test and also provides additional information regarding the direction and level of dependence.
Although the contingency table approach will identify whether there is any directional relationship between the Risk Adjustment Ratio and either past performance or the moneyness of the incentive option, this approach assumes that the relationship is linear. In order to examine further this relationship we construct tables where Normalised RAR is conditioned upon either:
i) 12 levels of moneyness between 0.70 and 1.30, and
ii) 10 Deciles of relative performance
For each of these sub-samples we then test whether the median Normalised RAR is significantly different from zero using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.
Results
In panel A of Table 2 we present summary statistics of the median annualised return for each strategy and for all funds on an annual basis using a 6 month assessment period; in Panel B
we present the median moneyness for the same break down of funds over the assessment period; while in Panel C we present the RAR for the assessment period for the same stratification.
Table 2 here
These results clearly illustrate the heterogeneous nature of the ten hedge fund strategies being examined. For example consider a global macro hedge fund in 1994 that produced an annualised return of 1% in the first half of the year and had a RAR of 0.80. Treating hedge funds as one homogenous group would classify this as being below the 1.5% median return and below the 0.85 median RAR, yet it is considerably above the median return of -8.3% and above the median RAR of 0.74 for funds following the same strategy, namely global macro.
Additionally market conditions at particular points in time can affect different strategies in different ways, for example the median RAR for fixed income arbitrage funds during the 1998 LTCM/Russian debt crisis was 2.93, but it was only 1.33 for global macro funds and 1.84 for all hedge funds.
Although we do calculate the performance statistics described in Section 3 above treating all hedge funds as one group, we believe that the results are more meaningful when they are considered by strategy. Tables   Table 3 shows the contingency table results et al (1996) for mutual funds: those funds that have generated returns that are below the median for their strategy over the first six months of the year are likely to increase risk more than the median fund possibly in order to try and improve their whole-of-year ranking; while those funds that have achieved above median returns for their strategy are more likely to decrease risk, possibly in order to protect their returns and relative performance rankings. Taking each year individually, the log odds ratio shows that the relationship is in the same direction for 12 out of the 14 years in the sample and is statistically significant for ten of these years.
Contingency
Panel B shows that for the full 14 year sample period we can reject the null hypothesis of independence between moneyness and the subsequent RAR with the Below HW Mark/High RAR and Above HW Mark/Low RAR cells having statistically significant and larger frequencies than the other two outcomes implying that those funds that find themselves below their high-water marks after six months increase risk relative to the median risk during the post assessment period, and those funds above it decrease risk. When we look at individual years, the log odds ratio shows that the relationship is only in the same direction for 10 out of the 14 years in the sample and significant for 8 of them. In fact in 2005 and 2007 the relationship is statistically significant and in the opposite direction -implying that in these years funds that were below their high water mark after 6 months reduced their risk relative to the median risk during the post assessment period.
These results imply that although hedge fund managers adjust their risk in response to both their relative returns and according to the moneyness of the incentive option the effect is more pronounced in the former rather than the latter case. This is borne out by the fact that the log odds ratio of 0.2708 is greater overall when performance is benchmarked against the median performance (last row, column (7) of Table 3 , Panel A) compared with a logs odds ratio of 0.09011 when performance is assessed as a function of the moneyness of the fund at the start of the post assessment period (last row, column (7) of Table 3 , Panel B).
After considering the case of M=6 we now consider other assessment and post assessment periods. Our original choice of M=6 was a relatively arbitrary one. It may be that funds change their risk exposures in response to their performance relative to their peers, or because of the moneyness of the incentive option earlier, or later in the year. In Table 4 we present results analogous to those in Table 3 but 
Table 4 here
Panel A in Table 4 shows that for all assessment periods the effect of relative return on normalised RAR is statistically significant but at a declining rate, as evidenced by the declining value of the log odds ratio that falls from 0.2401 to 0.1597. This result suggests that fund managers are more likely to change their risk taking behaviour earlier on in the year rather than later in the year -and most likely halfway through the year. The effect of moneyness appears to be only significant from M=6 upwards and at an increasing ratehere the log odds ratio increases from 0.0243 to 0.1180. This result is extremely interesting since it can be taken to imply that hedge fund managers care more about relative return early in the year but more about the value of their incentive option (absolute return) later on in the year. One possible explanation for this is that as the year moves towards its end managers have less chance or opportunity of increasing their ranking but can attempt to maximise the fees they will receive by increasing risk, though the data does not support this. The proportion of funds that are below their high-water mark that increase risk actually falls from 5 We repeat the results for M=6 here for completeness. Yearly results for each value of M are available on request.
15.68% over the (4,8) assessment period to 15.25% over the (8,4) assessment period.
Rather the result appears to be driven by the proportion of funds that are above their highwater mark who reduce risk which increases from 34.63% to 36.05%.
Disaggregated analysis
Having ascertained that there appears to be a relationship between the risk taking decisions of hedge fund managers and both their relative performance and the value of their incentive option using 2x2 contingency tables we now examine the relationship across a broader cross-section of relative returns and moneyness. Figure 4 here Table 6 presents the results for the effect of the moneyness of the incentive option (absolute performance) on subsequent Normalised RAR for M=6. These results are shown in Figure 5 too. Here we see that there is evidence of a statistically significant change in risk behaviour across the moneyness categories. For moneyness above 1.15, that is for fund's that are 15% above the high-water mark half way through the year, there appears to be a statistically significant risk reduction, this is in line with the theoretical models presented by Carpenter (2000) and Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) who describe this as "locking in" behaviour.
However for moneyness between 1.05 and 0.85 that is 5% above to 15% below the highwater mark after six months there is a statistically significant increase in risk. More interestingly we can see that for funds that are 15% below their high water mark after the first half of the year there is a reduction in risk taking behaviour. However, since this reduction in risk is not found to be statistically significant we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a Normalised RAR of zero, a result that does not support Carpenter's model (2000) 
Size & Age Effects
The previous analysis has shown that managers do appear to change their risk taking behaviour according to both relative performance and as a function of the value of their incentive option, with the former having the largest impact. As suggested by the theoretical literature on this topic, the implicit terms of the compensation contract do appear to inhibit excessive risk taking by fund managers who find themselves substantially below their highwater mark.
In the next section of the paper we examine whether fund characteristics such as size and age have any impact on risk taking behaviour.
Size
Using a Probit regression Liang (2000) shows that fund size is an important factor in determining fund survival with smaller funds more likely to liquidate. With this in mind we now examine whether small and large funds differ in their risk taking behaviour in response to relative performance and dependent upon the moneyness of their incentive option. Using the fund size data reported in Table 1 , we split the sample by defining large funds as those which are either larger than or equal to the median size and small funds as those that are smaller than the median size. We then carry out the same contingency analysis as in the previous section on these sub-samples. Table 9 here Table 9 presents the results for 2x2 contingency table tests. Panels A and B show that there is a statistically significant change in risk levels whether funds are categorised by their performance relative to other funds in the assessment period or by the moneyness of both large and small funds in the same direction. It would appear that the response to relative returns is greater for small than for large funds while the response to the moneyness of the incentive option is smaller. These results are consistent with the findings of Brown et al.
(1996) for mutual funds and also with the theoretical model of behaviour presented by Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) . Small funds who wish to attract assets will need to ensure that their relative performance is strong, thus if they are below (above) the median return at the half year assessment date they are more likely to increase (decrease) risk in order to try and improve (maintain) their ranking. However if small funds face a greater chance of liquidation than large funds, they are less likely to increase their risk if they are below their high-water marks.
In Table 10 and Figure 6 we present the results for the effect of relative performance on Normalised RAR for both large and small funds. Though the median normalised RAR for the first decile is more negative for the small fund sample, which suggests that smaller funds are more susceptible to "locking in" behaviour, the difference is not statistically significant. It is a similar story for the lower deciles, for the fifth, sixth, seventh and ninth deciles the median normalised RAR for the small firm sample is more positive, which suggests that smaller funds are more likely to increase risk, but once again the difference is not statistically significant. Figure 6 here
In Table 11 and in Figure 4 we present the results for the effect that the moneyness of the incentive option has on Normalised RAR for both large and small funds. For the funds that are significantly above their high-water mark, the median normalised RAR is more negative for the small fund sample (and in 1 case statistically significantly so) suggesting smaller funds are more susceptible to "locking in" behaviour. However for those funds that are at or below their high-water marks the median normalised RAR for the small sample is less positive than for large funds. This result would appear to be consistent with the literature because it could be the possibility of liquidation that prevents small funds from increasing risk. Table 11 and Figure 7 
Fund age
Both Liang (2000) and Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) identify age as an important factor in determining fund survival with younger funds more likely to liquidate. With this in mind we now examine whether young and old funds differ in their risk taking behaviour in response to relative and absolute returns. Using the fund age data reported in Table 11 , we split the sample by defining old funds as those which are either older or equal to the median age and young funds as those that are younger than the median size. We then carry out the same analysis as in the previous section on these sub-samples. show that there is a statistically significant response in risk to both relative performance and moneyness for both young and old funds in the same direction as previously reported. It would appear that the response to relative returns is almost identical for both young and old funds, while the response to absolute returns is slightly larger for young funds. This result is somewhat surprising and contrasts with both the results for size and with the theoretical literature. One would expect that young funds who wish to attract assets will have to ensure that their relative performance is strong, thus if they are below (above) the median return at the half year assessment date they are more likely to increase (decrease) risk in order to try and improve (maintain) their ranking, at the same time if younger funds face a greater chance of liquidation than older funds, they are less likely to increase their risk if they are below their high-water mark, but this is not supported by the data. Table 13 and Figure 8 present the results for the effect of relative performance on Normalised RAR for both young and old funds. As with the results for size, the median normalised RAR for the first decile is more negative for the young fund sample, suggesting that younger funds are more susceptible to "locking in" behaviour, but the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, examining the lower deciles, for the fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth deciles the median normalised RAR for the old sample is more positive, suggesting that older funds are more susceptible to increasing risk, but once again the difference is not statistically significant. Figure 8 here Table 14 and Figure 9 present the results for the effect of the moneyness of the incentive option has on Normalised RAR for both young and old funds. For the funds that are significantly above their high-water mark, the only apparent (and statistically significant) difference is that for younger funds the median normalised RAR is more negative in the 1.1 to 1.15 range of moneyness, this suggests that younger funds are more susceptible to "locking in" behaviour. However for those funds that are below their high-water mark the median normalised RAR for the young sample is less positive (or in one case negative).
Once again this result is consistent with the literature because if it is the threat of liquidation that is preventing excess increasing of risk, and younger funds have a higher probability of liquation, then they are less inclined to increase risk. 
Conclusions
We find evidence to suggest that hedge fund managers adjust the risk profile of their funds in response to their relative performance with managers of relatively poor (strong) performing funds increasing (decreasing) the risk profile of their funds. The hedge fund industry has always sold itself on the basis that it targets and aims to produce absolute returns for investors. That is, returns that are not benchmarked against specific financial market indices, or against a peer group. Our results call in to question this idea and suggests at a minimum that hedge funds pay attention to the performance of their peers. This may well be a consequence of the actions of fund of fund managers and other investors who make their own investment decisions based upon the relative performances of the funds in which they seek to invest. It may well be an unintended consequence of the way in which investors choose to invest in a fund.
Our results with regard to how hedge fund managers adjust the risk profile of their fund given the moneyness of their incentive option are more complex. Managers whose incentive option is well in the money decrease risk. Relatively speaking these managers are protecting the value of this option towards the end of the year. For investors who wish their managers to take risks in a consistent manner regardless of the month of the year, this result may come as a disappointment. It suggests that there is an element of "locking in" behaviour particularly towards the end of the calendar year. Perhaps of more interest is the risk taking behaviour of those fund managers who find their incentive option to be well out of the money.
We find that these managers do not "put it all on black" in order to "win" back earlier losses and to increase the value of their incentive option. This should be good news for hedge fund investors. This conservative behaviour may be due to the implicit terms of the manager's contract. As Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) suggest, these implicit terms may include the risk of liquidation as investors withdraw funds and may also be due to the often substantial management stake in the fund that discourages the fund manager from "swinging the bat".
Our results are of significance for the design of hedge fund manager compensation contracts. It would appear that the concern that incentive fees encourage excessive risk taking behaviour may be misplaced, however there does appear to be an incentive to "lock in" previous gains by reducing the risk profile of the fund. It is possible that this locking in behaviour could be reduced by introducing a rising scale of incentive fees. 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Convertible Arbitrage  26  38  40  47  51  64  75  81  104  120  122  105  97  66  Dedicated Short Bias  11  13  12  14  17  17  22  18  18  19  20  19  20  15  Emerging Markets  46  72  101  120  132  149  155  149  144  144  166  190  219  228  Equity Market Neutral  12  20  31  41  55  77  106  116  148  170  175  188  194  163  Event Driven  63  80  104  134  162  174  194  215  233  273  314  341  319  284  Fixed Income Arbitrage  19  30  41  55  55  67  69  77  91  115  144  166  159  132  Global Macro  48  55  61  68  83  87  76  77  89  112  135  139  147 Notes: The table presents median values for various statistics for both individual strategies and for all funds in the sample using a 6 month assessment and post assessment period. Panel A presents the median annualised return for M=6 calculated from equation (2) in the text. Panel B presents the median moneyness for M=6 calculated from equation (4). Panel C presents the median risk adjustment ratio calculated from equation (3) for M=6. Notes: Proportions in the body of the table give the proportion of funds that fall into each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete return history for each calendar year. Above and below median measures are defined as Normalised Return or RAR greater or less than zero. The log odds ratio is the log of the ratio of the product of the second and third columns to the product of the first and fourth with standard error and the t-value measures the significance of this ratio. The chi-square number represent the statistics from the 2x2 contingency tables with 1 degree of freedom. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. Notes: Proportions in the body of the table give the proportion of funds falling into each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete return history for each calendar year. Above and below median measures are defined as Normalised Return or RAR greater or less than zero. The log odds ratio is the log of the ratio of the product of the second and third columns to the product of the first and fourth with standard error and the t-value measuring the significance of this. The chi-square number represents the statistics from the 2x2 contingency tables with 1 degree of freedom. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. Notes: Proportions in the body of the table give the proportion of funds falling into each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete return history for each calendar year. Above and below median measures are defined as Normalised Return or RAR greater or less than zero. The log odds ratio is the log of the ratio of the product of the second and third columns to the product of the first and fourth with standard error and the t-value measuring the significance of this. The chi-square number represents the statistics from the 2x2 contingency tables with 1 degree of freedom. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. Notes: Proportions in the body of the table give the proportion of funds falling into each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete return history for each calendar year. Above and below median measures are defined as Normalised Return or RAR greater or less than zero. The log odds ratio is the log of the ratio of the product of the second and third columns to the product of the first and fourth with standard error and the t-value measuring the significance of this. The chi-square number represents the statistics from the 2x2 contingency tables with 1 degree of freedom. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. Notes: Proportions in the body of the table give the proportion of funds falling into each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete return history for each calendar year. Above and below median measures are defined as Normalised Return or RAR greater or less than zero. The log odds ratio is the log of the ratio of the product of the second and third columns to the product of the first and fourth with standard error and the t-value measuring the significance of this. The chi-square number represents the statistics from the 2x2 contingency tables with 1 degree of freedom. Values significant at the 5% level are denoted with * and those significant at 1% by **. This figure shows the normalised risk adjustment ratio by level of moneyness and age with statistically significant values in black and others in grey
